

# **THE EFFECT OF OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS ON ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT ATTRITION RATES AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS**

**A Monograph  
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## ABSTRACT

The Effect of Operational Deployments on Army Reserve Component Attrition Rates and Its Strategic Implications by MAJOR Jon A. Jensen, United States Army National Guard, 51 pages.

This monograph will assess the effects of operational deployments on Army Reserve Component attrition rate and its strategic implications for the U.S. Army. It will challenge the belief that the current use of the Army Reserve Component in peace time operational deployments is having a negative effect on its attrition rate.

Following the end of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm the United States' military began a dramatic down sizing of its active and reserve forces. By the end of 1993, the U.S. Army had been reduced from its late 1980s size of eighteen combat divisions to only ten combat divisions. As the draw down of military forces continued the number of operational deployments increased for the active Army. Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were added to the active Army's already crowded plate that included the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Peninsula and Operation Southern Watch in Southwest Asia. It became apparent that the active Army required assistance with these additional missions or risk a degradation of its unit readiness and morale. As a result of this dilemma, the decision was made to activate units and personnel of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to support on-going deployments.

This monograph reviews the findings of four studies conducted to determine the effects of operational deployments on the U.S. military. In addition, the attrition rate for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve is reviewed, to include high demand units, in order to determine linkages between the increased use of the reserve component and corresponding attrition.

The conclusion of the monograph is that peace time operational deployments are not having a negative effect on the attrition rate of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Supporting this conclusion is the consistent decrease in the Army National Guard's attrition rate during the period 1993-2000 and the fairly steady attrition rate of the Army Reserve during the same period. Recommendations are proposed to ensure that this trend continues. This finding is significant because it refutes a general belief that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are being "broken" by their increased use in peace time operational deployments.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

*The bottom line is that we cannot go to war, enforce a peace agreement, or undertake prolonged humanitarian missions anywhere in the world today without calling on the Guard and Reserve.<sup>1</sup>*

—Charles L. Cragin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

As a result of the tragic events of 11 September 2001, the largest mobilization of reserve component units and personnel since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS) is taking place. This mobilization continues with the overwhelming support of the American public, reserve component soldiers, and all levels of state and federal government. Preceding the current mobilization there existed a period of “quiet mobilizations.” Thousands of reserve component soldiers mobilized and performed duty in support of military operations throughout the world. Although I will address the current mobilization and its implications to the Army Reserve Component (ARC), the focus of this monograph is the period of “quiet mobilizations”, its effect on the attrition rate of the ARC and the strategic implications.

The utilization of “quiet mobilizations” became a reality for the U.S. Army because of the national security strategy change between the first Bush and Clinton Administrations. These administrations shifted the U.S. national security from a security strategy focused on containing the spread of communism and global conflict to a security strategy focused on containing regional conflict and the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technologies. The corresponding change in U.S. military force structure resulted in the dramatic reduction of active and reserve component forces. The reality of the new strategic environment was an era not of peace, but one of increased conflict. To meet this conflict, a stranding U.S. active military force

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<sup>1</sup>Charles L. Cragin, “Guard, Reserve Contract Has Changed,” *National Guard* 54, no 9 (September 2000): 1.

quickly found itself facing readiness and personnel problems brought on by multiple, long duration peacekeeping deployments.

The impetus behind this monograph derives from the author's participation in an Army National Guard operational deployment to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Desert Spring in January 2001. The Army National Guard began supporting this mission in 1999, where previous only Active Army units supported the mission. This deployment represented the first federal mobilization of this Army National Guard unit since World War II. Although this deployment was unique for the participating soldiers, it was only one of several on-going Army National Guard operational deployments in support of U.S. Army operations. During and immediately following this deployment many senior members of the National Guard Bureau, the division staff of the 34<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, and senior members of the Iowa Army National Guard expressed concern for the effect of the deployment on soldier's desires to continue their service in the Iowa Army National Guard. Their fear was that the use of reserve component soldiers in peace time operational missions may cause problems in the Army National Guard's ability to maintain its soldiers.

From this deployment experience in support of Operation Desert Spring sprang the thesis for this monograph: "Are peace time operational deployments having an adverse effect on the attrition rate of the deployed Army Reserve Component (ARC) units?"

## **Historical Perspective**

The origins of the United States National Guard are traced back to the North, South, and East Regiments of the Massachusetts Colony. The state militia concept which provided for little or no federal government oversight came to an end with the passing of the Militia Act of 1903. This act prescribed a legal relationship between the state and federal forces and incorporated the National

Guard into the nation's military system.<sup>2</sup> For the first time federal funds were pledged to the National Guard for weapons and equipment procurement, unit training, officer military education, uniforms, and administrative supplies. In exchange for this monetary support, the states were required to attain minimum personnel strength, conduct a standardized number of training days, and agree to an annual inspection by the Active Army. In addition, the president was authorized to call the organized militia for up to nine months active service to repel invasion, suppress invasion, or enforce federal law.<sup>3</sup> With the Militia Act of 1903, the modern Army National Guard was born.

The Army Reserve was born on 23 April 1908, with the passage of Senate Bill 1424 which provided for the creation of the Medical Reserve Corps. This bill authorized the U.S. Army to develop a reserve corps of medical officers who would be ordered to active duty during the time of national emergency. Four years later, the Army Appropriations Act of 24 August 1912 created the modern day Army Reserve. A key component of the 1912 Army Appropriations Act was the change in the length of the active army enlistment. The new term of the enlistment was now seven years, of which three years was to be with the Army Reserve.<sup>4</sup> The first use of the U.S. Army Reserve took place on 28 June 1916 when 3,000 Reservists were mobilized in support of the ongoing Mexican Boarder crisis. Another milestone was reached in 1917 when the U.S. Army Reserve received separate appropriations as part of the total War Department Appropriations for the first time.<sup>5</sup>

Significant utilizations of the ARC during the 20<sup>th</sup> Century took place during World War I and World War II. ARC contributions to the World War I effort included nearly 450,000 personnel from the Army National Guard, approximately 20% of the American Expeditionary

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<sup>2</sup>Jerry Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865-1920* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 111.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 109-110.

<sup>4</sup>Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 17-22.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 28 and 274

Force,<sup>6</sup> and 160,000 Army Reservists.<sup>7</sup> World War II participation for the Army Reserve consisted of 200,000 personnel<sup>8</sup> while the Army National Guard's participation included the service of 300,000 personnel in eighteen combat divisions and numerous non-divisional units.<sup>9</sup> ARC participation in the Korean War and Vietnam War was very low when compared to the other wars of this nation's past.

The post Vietnam basis of the reserve component employment comes from the 1973 Total Force Policy. As the Vietnam War began to lose its public and congressional support, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird knew that pending defense spending cuts would result in the overall reduction in force strengths and corresponding U.S. military capabilities. Secretary Laird believed that the end result of this action would require an increased reliance on the reserve component.<sup>10</sup> As a counter balance to the downsizing of the active component, and to meet Cold War requirements in fighting a European land battle between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, Secretary Laird proposed a "Total Force Concept." This concept was to apply in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping, and employment of the Guard and the Reserve.<sup>11</sup> Two tenants of the Total Force Concept were the reliance on reserve forces as the primary augmentation of the active forces and full integration of all available active, reserve, civilian, and allied personnel.<sup>12</sup> During this period, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams' desire was to structure the U.S. Army to make active and reserve units so interdependent that a president

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<sup>6</sup>Cooper, 171.

<sup>7</sup>Ronald S. Hunter, *2000 Reserve Forces Almanac*, (Falls Church, VA: Uniformed Service Almanac, Inc, 2000), 137.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ronald S. Hunter, *2000 National Guard Almanac*, (Falls Church, VA: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc, 2000), 141.

<sup>10</sup>National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 1992), 33.

<sup>11</sup>Stephen M. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors, American's National Guard and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security* (Navato, CA: Presidio Press 1997), 137.

<sup>12</sup>National Defense Research Institute, 4.

could not send military forces to combat without activation reserve component personnel and forces.<sup>13</sup>

In August 1973, the Total Force Concept became the Total Force Policy when Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger released an implementation memorandum to his service secretaries. In this memorandum he wrote, “Total Force is no longer a ‘concept.’ It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogeneous whole.”<sup>14</sup> Although the Total Force Policy would remain an unfulfilled policy until ODS, it laid the framework for the use of the reserve component forces as seen during the first Bush, Clinton, and second Bush administrations.

The newly established Total Force Policy required a change in the way reserve component personnel could be activated into federal service. Title 10 of the United States Code identifies four methods of making reserve component forces available for operational missions: volunteers, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and presidential selective reserve call up.<sup>15</sup> The last method identified serves as the primary method of activating ARC personnel and units in support of contingency and operational missions. The request and approval of the presidential selective call-up recognized the reliance the Total Force Policy placed on the initial and primary augmentation for active forces in a period without a declaration of a national emergency. A presidential selective call up gives the president the authority to call up as many as 200,000 reserves, up to 270 days, in order to augment contingency and operational missions. This provided the president with the flexibility to provide augmentation to the active component without declaring a national emergency, making the shift of forces from the active to the reserve component more acceptable to military planners.<sup>16</sup> It was the presidential selective reserve call up

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<sup>13</sup>Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and the Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” *Parameters* (Summer 1991): 35.

<sup>14</sup>Duncan, 141.

<sup>15</sup>National Defense Research Institute, 41.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 42.

that allowed reserve component force to be available for contingency deployments following ODS.

The reality of a shrunken military force that followed the Vietnam War changed in 1979, following the failure of Desert One and the election of President Ronald Reagan. During the Reagan administration the overall military strength increased by thirty-two percent.<sup>17</sup> On the eve of ODS, the U.S. Army maintained active duty strength of over 751,000 personnel and eighteen divisions.<sup>18</sup> Reserve component strength was also at its peak. The Army National Guard consisted of 437,000 soldiers and ten divisions while the Army Reserve consisted of over 299,000 soldiers.<sup>19</sup> This would be the high-water mark for the U.S. Army following the post-Vietnam era.

The Total Force Policy was finally put to the test in 1990 with U.S. participation in ODS. During this conflict reserve component services provided over 222,000 personnel to the war effort.<sup>20</sup> The ARC's contribution to this effort was over 146,000 soldiers or sixty-six percent.<sup>21</sup>

### **Scope of Monograph**

There are seven different branches in the United States Reserve Component, with each branch providing different types and levels of support to its active duty service. This monograph will limit its research to the reserve branches of the U.S. Army in order to avoid the exhaustive task of comparing the different cultures of twelve different elements of the U.S. military service and comparing the different relations between each active service and their associated reserve components.

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<sup>17</sup>*The Military Balance 1979-1980*, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), 5-8. *The Military Balance 1988-1989*, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), 18. This increase includes active and reserve component strength.

<sup>18</sup>Association of the United States Army, *Army Budget Fiscal Year 2000, An Analysis* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, August 1999), 37.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup>Cragin, 132.

<sup>21</sup>John B. Conaway, *Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau. Departments of the Army and Air Force*, (Alexandria, VA: National Guard Bureau), 1.

The monograph's scope is further limited by considering only attrition rate. Attrition rate provides a hard figure that is easily compared between years, between different branches of the U.S. Army, and is tracked by all elements of the U.S. military. Attrition rate also provides an insight into the effects of a particular issue or policy from the soldier's view. This is sometimes referred to as soldiers "voting with their boots."

## **Thesis Methodology**

In order to understand the current role of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve one must review and understand the changes to the strategic role of these components during the period 1991-2001. Chapters Two and Three provide background information on the roles of each of these components by reviewing the United States' published National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and other related documents of this period.

Chapter Four will review the findings of related research studies and their recommendations in order to provide background data on the subject. In addition to these studies, specific attrition rate data of mobilized personnel and units is compared to the attrition data for the entire reserve component during the same period of time in order to provide a comparison. Conclusions and recommendations are made in Chapter Five in order to provide input to the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Army Reserve concerning this important issue.

Chapter Five provides recommendations based on the evidence provided by the research. The recommendations are made in order to provide input to the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Army Reserve concerning this important issue.

## **Key Terms and Definitions**

Several key terms utilized throughout the monograph are defined below. They provide the reader with a common understanding of the definitions as they pertain to this monograph.

Army Reserve Component (ARC): This term describes all forces in the United States Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve. This monograph will limit its scope to these forces. A total of seven forces make up the complete United States Reserve Component: U.S. Air Force Reserve, U.S. Air National Guard, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve, U.S. Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, and U.S. Navy Reserve. An attempt to consider all seven organizations is beyond the scope of this monograph.

Attrition Rate: This term describes, as a percentage, the number of soldiers leaving an organization compared to the total number of soldiers in the organization. Usually computed and stated as an annual figure. This term is synonymous with turnover rate. Both organizations in the ARC establish an annual attrition rate as criteria to determine its success retaining soldiers.

Extension Rate: This term describes, as a percentage, the number of soldiers who reenlist relative to the number of soldiers eligible to reenlist. Attrition rate is a better criterion because it takes into account all soldiers and all losses versus only those soldiers eligible for extending their service. Extension rate does play a large role in attrition because it is often an indicator of a positive command climate and an indicator of an individual's satisfaction with military service.

OPTEMPO: This is the rate of military actions or missions conducted by a unit. These military actions fit into one of three categories: deployments, training, or garrison duty.<sup>22</sup> In essence, this measures unit activity. My research brought to light the fact that military leaders, political leaders, and other researchers often use OPTEMPO in place of PERSTEMPO. These two terms are not the same for they measure two different tempos; OPTEMPO measures unit activity while the PERSTEMPO measures individual activity.

PERSTEMPO: This can be measured in many different dimensions. Higher PERSTEMPO may mean more hours of work per day, more work days per week, more work weeks per year, more hours on alert, or a faster pace of work per hour. Traditionally, PERSTEMPO means more

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<sup>22</sup>Carl A. Castro and Amy B. Adler, "OPTEMPO: Effects on Soldier and Unit Readiness," *Parameters* 29, no. 3 (Autum 1999): 87.

time on duty away from home or more time deployed, per unit of time.<sup>23</sup> In 1996, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the PERSTEMPO Working Group to research PERSTEMPO for the Department of Defense. They recommended that PERSTEMPO be defined as any day away from home for operations and unit training purposes.<sup>24</sup> In essence, PERSTEMPO measures individual activity. A soldier may have a PERSTEMPO that is different from his unit's OPTEMPO, and conversely. An example is a soldier who remains at home station during a unit deployment to staff the unit's rear detachment.

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC): This is the primary method that reserve component soldiers and units are ordered to active duty in support of military operations. This process begins when a combatant commander-in-chief (CINC) recommends the execution of an operations plan. The CINC forwards his forces required request to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chairman will validate the force requirements, coordinate with the services, and make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that reserve component be mobilized. The Secretary of Defense reviews the recommendation, and if he concurs, he will recommend mobilization to the President. After consulting with Congress the President then issues an Executive Order authorizing the involuntary call-up of reserve component units and personnel. This PSRC process is utilized to support both major theater of war conflicts and peacetime contingency operations.<sup>25</sup>

### **Attrition as an Indicator of Readiness**

Attrition rate is a key component to the overall readiness of a unit. An ARC unit reports its readiness quarterly on the Unit Status Report. As part of this report, each ARC unit reports its

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<sup>23</sup>James Hosek and Mark Totten, *Does Perstempo Hurt Reenlistment, The Effect of Long or Hostile Perstemp on Reenlistment*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 1998), 3.

<sup>24</sup>U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the PERSTEMPO Working Group, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 July 1996.

<sup>25</sup>Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board Fiscal Year 1999*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2000), 3-4.

quarterly attrition rate to give an indication of its readiness. Attrition has a direct impact on the assigned strength of a unit. As attrition increases, a unit's assigned strength will typically decrease. With even a small decrease of assigned strength, a unit's training proficiency and readiness levels will decrease. This training proficiency decrease is caused by having fewer soldiers available to conduct collective training at the platoon, company, and battalion level. As training proficiency declines a unit's ability to conduct its mission essential tasks also diminishes.

Recruiting new members into an organization is always important. Recruiting new members to a unit with a large number of vacancies becomes critical. Currently, fewer youngsters are interested in joining the military making replacing lost members more difficult.<sup>26</sup> There is also a monetary cost to high attrition. The replacement cost of ARC soldiers is estimated to be \$30,000 for an Army National Guard member and \$42,000 for an Army Reservist.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid. 56. Reasons given were the booming economy, fewer individuals leaving active duty which reduced the pool of prior service members available, and the dwindling number of veterans, local military advocates, and role models which caused military service to be viewed as alien.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 59. This cost includes pay and benefits, advertising, transportation, recruiter compensation and facilities support, medical and dental evaluations, uniforms, and training costs.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 1991-1994: A TIME FOR CHANGE

*Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States...together with units of other reserve components necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active duty and retained as long as so needed.*

-- U.S. Code Title 10, Section 10103<sup>28</sup>

The period 1991 to 1994 was a critical period when studying reserve component policy, roles, and missions. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm successfully ended the first large-scale implementation of the Total Force Policy that shaped active and reserve component relations and strategy since the early 1970s. Following the victory in the Arabian Gulf and the end of the Cold War, U.S. national security and military strategy requirements changed to meet a new era of threats. As these strategies changed, the force structure and roles of military forces also changed. These security strategy and force structure changes set the conditions for the use of ARC forces that exist today.

Following ODS, two significant challenges faced the ARC and its strategic relevance: how questionable readiness would effect further integration with the Active Army, and how to ensure the coming force structure reductions did not hinder integration with the Active Army. Three major strategy documents shaped this period of active/reserve integration.

In August 1990, President George H. Bush addressed the Aspen Institute Symposium and gave a preview of his security strategy and his vision of the U.S. military. With the following words, he developed the groundwork for a dramatic change to the force structure of the U.S. armed forces:

In a world less driven by an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war, in a world where the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence, we know that our forces can be smaller. Secretary Cheney and General Powell are hard at work

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<sup>28</sup>Title 10 United States Code. Web site accessed 5 December 2001. Available at <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/10103.text.html>.

determining the precise combination of forces that we need. But I can tell you now, we calculate that by 1995 our security needs can be met by an active force 25 percent smaller than today's. America's Armed Forces will be at their lowest level since the year 1950.<sup>29</sup>

Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait, and the subsequent ODS prevented President Bush from implementing his vision until one year later. In August 1991, President Bush published his national security strategy (NSS). In this document, he reintegrated his call for a smaller military when writing:

Our future military will be smaller. Assuming there are no unforeseen, worrisome trends in the security environment, by mid-decade our force can be some 25 percent smaller than the force we maintained in the last days of the Cold War. The changes we have seen in the overall international environment have made this smaller force possible, and the increasing demands on our resources to preserve the other elements of our national strength have made it necessary.<sup>30</sup>

With his national security strategy, President Bush aspired to "build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals," as the Cold War world ended.<sup>31</sup> President Bush described the national security interests and objectives as:

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.<sup>32</sup>

In addition to a reduction of forces, President Bush called for a strategic shift in the use of reserve component forces. President Bush foresaw future military operations consisting of small-scale, short-duration regional contingencies. Therefore, there was no longer a need for a large number of high-quality, well-trained, well-equipped and early-mobilizing reserve component forces in

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<sup>29</sup>George H. Bush, *Remarks by the President at the Address to the Aspen Institute Symposium* (paper presented at the Aspen Institute Symposium, Aspen, CO, August 2, 1990). Web site accessed 22 December 2001. Available at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1990/90080206.html>.

<sup>30</sup>George H. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1991), 31.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, v.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.* 3-4.

this new environment. President Bush saw the reserve component acting as a supplement to active forces only in an especially large or protracted deployment or during a renewed global confrontation, both of which he felt was very unlikely.<sup>33</sup> Thus began the highly emotional battle for force structure between the Active Army and ARC that would mark the middle part of the decade.

Approximately five months after the publication of President Bush's NSS, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, released the National Military Strategy (NMS) titled *National Military Strategy 1992: Strategy of Adaptation*. With it, General Powell reemphasized President Bush's shift away from global confrontation to one of regional crises. He wrote, "Our plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring and fighting regional rather than global wars. Forward presence and crisis response are fundamental to our regional oriented strategy."<sup>34</sup> General Powell envisioned achieving the national security interests and objectives by:

1. Deterring any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and – should deterrence fail – repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies.
2. Effectively countering threats to the security of the United States and its citizens, including the threat of international terrorism.
3. Improving stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems capable of defending against limited ballistic missile strikes, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities.
4. Fostering restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism.
5. Preventing the transfer of military critical technologies and resources to hostile countries.
6. Reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging a reduction in production, combating international traffickers, and reducing demand at home.
7. Ensuring access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space.
8. Strengthening and enlarging the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights.
9. Strengthening international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic, and social progress.
10. Maintaining stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.
11. Aiding in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>34</sup>Colin L. Powell, *National Military Strategy 1992: Strategy of Adaptation* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, January 1992), 11.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 5.

With no peer competitor in sight or on the horizon, General Powell believed, along with President Bush, that future confrontation would consist of short duration crisis involving active duty forces. Reserve component forces would only be needed when regional crises expanded outside the region or became protracted. With the publication of Bush's NSS and Powell's NMS, the official U.S. strategy focused on a security environment calling for quick deploying forces that were capable of defeating regional threats in short duration crisis.

Total Army strength began to show an immediate reduction because of the shifting strategy. At the end of the Reagan Administration, total Army personnel strength was approximately 1,549,000.<sup>36</sup> On the eve of ODS the Bush Administration had reduced total Army strength to 1,487,000.<sup>37</sup> Reductions continued as President Bush implemented his force reduction vision. By the end of his term total Army strength dropped to 1,339,000.<sup>38</sup>

Particularly hard hit during this reduction was the U.S. Active Army. Personnel strength for the Active Army was reduced by 46,000 personnel between 1988 and 1991 and then by an additional 124,000 personnel between 1991 and 1992. In comparison, the Army National Guard personnel strength was reduced by only 15,000 between 1988 and 1991 and then by an additional 15,000 by 1992. The Army Reserve was reduced by 13,000 personnel between 1988 and 1991 and then by an additional 9,000 by 1992.<sup>39</sup>

An active army force twenty-two percent smaller than at the end of the Reagan administration and seventeen percent smaller than at the eve of ODS was implementing President Bush's new security strategy, a security strategy that stressed the uncertainty of the era. Not only was the Active Army asked to become smaller, but also they were told not to count on significant support

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<sup>36</sup>Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1988* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1989), 38.

<sup>37</sup>AUSA, 37.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

from the ARC. In the view of President Bush and General Powell, the ARC would only participate in long term, global conflicts only.

In October 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin published the first strategic vision document of the newly elected Clinton Administration. The *Bottom Up Review* was an attempt to “define the strategy, force structure, modernize programs, industrial base, and infrastructure needed to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities.”<sup>40</sup> The *Bottom Up Review* urged a continuation of the previous administration’s belief that with the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces could be reduced from Cold War levels. Secretary Aspin ultimately called for a reduction of military personnel strength even greater than the Bush/Powell proposals.

In determining the shape and size of future U.S. military forces, Secretary Aspin considered what he termed the “objectives of the armed forces” and the potential military missions. These objectives and missions laid out for the U.S. military forces were:

1. Maintaining the ability to deter the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
2. Halting or slowing the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
3. Deterring and, if necessary, defeating major aggression in regions important to the U.S.
4. Being capable of fighting and winning two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously.
5. Prepared to participate effectively in multilateral peace enforcement and unilateral intervention operations.
6. Using military to military contacts to help foster democratic reform.
7. Protecting fledgling democracies from subversion and external threats.<sup>41</sup>

For the ARC forces a key change between Secretary Aspin’s vision and the vision of the Bush/Powell team was the belief that ARC forces, “will be better trained, more capable, and more ready.”<sup>42</sup> Secretary Aspin used the example of an Army National Guard brigade mobilized early during a conflict in order to provide extra security and flexibility. This was an admission that proposed active army force structure reductions would stretch the active army’s ability to meet all

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<sup>40</sup>Les Aspin, *The Bottom Up Review*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1993). Web site accessed 7 December 2001. Available at <http://fas.org/man/docs/bur/part01.htm>.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

of the challenges of the changing world. To hedge against an over extended active force, Secretary Aspin proposed a prepared reserve force maintained at a high personnel and readiness level. Secretary Aspin's vision would be played out during the last part of the 1990's.

The effect of the *Bottom Up Review* on U.S. military personnel strength was dramatic. Army National Guard personnel strength was reduced by 51,000 between 1992 and 1995. Army Reserve strength was reduced by 58,000 during the same period. Active Army personnel strength again felt the brunt of the personnel cuts and ended 1995 at 509,000 personnel, a reduction of 102,000 personnel from their 1992 end strength. Total Army strength was now down twenty-eight percent since 1988 and the Active Army forces were down thirty-five percent during the same period.<sup>43</sup>

Force structure reductions of the active component during the Bush and Clinton administrations and the Clinton Administration's desire to more fully integrate the reserve component resulted in the ARC's participation in a historic mission. In 1994, a multi-component infantry battalion began training for a 1995 deployment to the Sinai Desert as part of the United Nation's Multinational Force and Observer's Mission (MFO). This UN mission supported the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. When deployed to the Sinai, 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion 505<sup>th</sup> Parachute Infantry consisted of 109 Active soldiers, 380 Army National Guard soldiers, and forty-two Army Reserve soldiers.<sup>44</sup> This deployment was historic because it was the first time ARC soldiers were used in place of active duty component forces in an attempt to reduce PERSTEMPO. Prior to this mission, the U.S. Army typically used only active duty forces while participating in peace operations.<sup>45</sup> The ARC was tasked with this mission in order to determine

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<sup>43</sup>AUSA, 37.

<sup>44</sup>Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1995* (Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Defense, March 1996), 26.

<sup>45</sup>David R. Segal and Ronald B. Tiggler, "Attitudes of Citizen-Soldiers Toward Military Missions in the Post Cold War World," *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 374

two objectives: the feasibility of using ARC forces in extended operational deployments, and thus, determining the feasibility of ARC soldiers in reducing the OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO of active component forces and personnel. The expanded use of the ARC during the 1990's is evidence of the success enjoyed by this multi-component infantry battalion.

In conclusion, the period between the end of ODS and the end of 1994 was one of dramatic change. The first came in the form of a changed security strategy. The U.S. security strategy moved from one of global confrontation and containment of the Soviet Union, to one of regional conflicts and military operations other than war. The second dealt with the role of the reserve component. Entering the decade, reserve component involvement in implementing the U.S. security strategy was one of integration and participation. During the final years of the Bush/Powell team that role became one of strategic reserve used only in the return of global confrontation. At the end of this period, the reserve component role changed back to integrated partner. The final change took place with U.S. Army personnel strength. From 1991, the Total Army was reduced by twenty-four percent, with the active component absorbing over sixty percent of the reduction. With its reduced strength the U.S. Army was about to enter into a period of increased commitments. The era would also mark an era of unprecedented force integration and reserve component reliance.

## CHAPTER THREE

### 1995-2001: BOSNIA AND BEYOND

*Today, I declare that we are THE Army, totally integrated with a unity of purpose – no longer the Total Army, no longer One Army. We are THE Army, and we will march into the 21<sup>st</sup> century as THE Army.*

-- General Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff<sup>46</sup>

#### **National Security and Military Security Strategies**

As the decade of the 1990s continued, the U.S. Army found itself involved in more and more nontraditional missions. For example, United States Army Europe (USAREUR) participated in twenty-nine peacekeeping or humanitarian missions during the forty-four year period between 1945 and 1989. During the eight-year period between 1991 and 1999, USAREUR participated in over 100 such missions. This increased OPTEMPO affected the PERSTEMPO of USAREUR soldiers. Nearly fifty percent of the soldiers participating in the initial deployment to the Balkans in support of the Dayton Peace Accords found themselves returning to the same area in support of the same mission.<sup>47</sup> This increased OPTEMPO was a result of the evolving national and military strategies of the Clinton Administration.

During the period of 1995-2000, President Clinton and his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, published two national security strategies and two national military strategies. Following is a review of their major themes.

President Clinton's central goals of his 1995 NSS, entitled *A Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, were to sustain the U.S.'s security with a prepared military force, bolster the economic revitalization of the U.S., and to promote democracy abroad.<sup>48</sup> President Clinton stressed that a global economy linked by an instantaneous communications network had removed

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<sup>46</sup>Charles L. Cragin, *Milestones on the Road to Integration*. Web site accessed 22 August 2001. Web site available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/news/articles/ROA00final.htm>.

<sup>47</sup>Carl A. Castro and Amy B. Adler, 86-87.

<sup>48</sup>William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 1995), i.

the line between foreign and domestic policies. He felt that the global opportunities available to the U.S. economy could only be realized by engaging in world affairs and enlarging the number of free markets available to the U.S. economy. Obviously, President Clinton saw the important link between the health of the U.S. economy and the health of the global economy.

President Clinton called for the following defense capabilities to support this strategy of globally interdependent economies:

1. Deterring and defeating aggression in major regional states with interests opposed to those of the United States.
2. Providing a credible overseas presence to deter aggression and advance U.S. strategic interests.
3. Countering weapons of mass destruction.
4. Contributing to multinational peace operations to resolve regional conflict and bolster new democracies.
5. Supporting counterterrorism efforts and other national security objectives.<sup>49</sup>

The fourth of President Clinton's listed military capabilities proved the most often used military capability during the middle-to-late 1990s. Clinton believed that through multinational peace operations the U.S. could prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that would otherwise be far more costly and deadly.<sup>50</sup>

General Shalikashvili foresaw the effect of Clinton's security strategy on the U.S. military. In the conclusion of his 1995 National Military Strategy, he wrote, "Security issues are more complex and increasing in nature. Our actions must be appropriate to meet specific challenges. This requires a high tempo of military activities..."<sup>51</sup> To meet this high tempo of military activities he called for a balanced military capability supporting land, sea, air, and space requirements. General Shalikashvili's most telling remarks about the reserve component dealt with his forecast of a higher reserve component military tempo. He wrote, "Reserve component elements will take on an increased responsibility for participating in and supporting peacekeeping

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 16.

<sup>51</sup>John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1995), 6.

missions.”<sup>52</sup> In addition, he stressed the need for early access to reserve component capabilities in order to meet power projection requirements for any major regional contingency.<sup>53</sup>

In 1997, General Shalikashvili's NMS called for the U.S. military to shape the international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crisis in order to protect our national interests, and to take steps to prepare now for an uncertain future.<sup>54</sup> Reserve component contributions to General Shalikashvili's strategy were somewhat refined from the 1995 NMS. In a return to the Total Force Policy spirit he reiterated the historical link between the reserve component and national will, "Mobilization of the Reserve Components has always been an important indicator of the commitment of national will." General Shalikashvili listed the reserve component key contributions to the NMS as the following: providing critical skills in carrying out contingency operations, augmenting and supporting active units in peacetime, providing the National Command Authority with an expansive force if necessary, and a base to provide relief from unit and individual deployment tempo for the active component.<sup>55</sup>

Augmenting General Shalikashvili's 1997 NMS was a memorandum from Secretary of Defense William Cohen stressing a Total Force integration. In this memorandum Secretary Cohen wrote, "Our goal, as we move into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, must be a seamless Total Force that provides the National Command Authorities the flexibility and interoperability for the full range of military operations. We cannot achieve this as separate components."<sup>56</sup> Secretary Cohen stated that only when the following four basic principles were achieved throughout the Department of Defense would the Total Force integration become a reality: ownership of the Total Force by senior leaders; an understanding of the peacetime and wartime missions for each active and

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>54</sup>John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Area* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997), 1.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 23-24.

<sup>56</sup>Don Mace, *2002 Military Reserve Handbook* (Glen Allen, VA: FEDweek, September 2001), 8-9.

reserve component; commitment to resourcing each component to accomplish its assigned missions; and the commitment of senior leaders to the readiness of the Total Force.<sup>57</sup>

President Clinton's 1999 NSS continued to focus on a strategy of international engagement with the diplomatic, economic, and military tools of power. President Clinton's engagement strategy was based on the premise that only by leading abroad, thus shaping the international environment, could the U.S. be secure at home. His core objectives of the engagement strategy were enhancing American security, bolstering U.S. economic prosperity, and promoting democracy and human right abroad.<sup>58</sup>

President Clinton wrote that the ultimate test of the U.S. armed forces was the ability to fight and win multiple major theater wars. This ability was contingent on maintaining three capabilities. First was the ability to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of their objectives. Secondly, the armed forces must be prepared to defeat an enemy using unconventional or asymmetric approaches. Third, the U.S. military must be prepared to transition to fighting major theater war from multiple concurrent small-scale contingency operations and substantial levels of peacetime engagement.<sup>59</sup>

Also in 1999, Secretary of Defense William Cohen released the finding of *The Reserve Component Employment Study 2005* (RCE-05). As required by the Fiscal Year 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance, the Department of Defense conducted a comprehensive study on the reserve component employment in order to develop recommendations to enhance the role of reserve component forces in the full spectrum of military operations. Specific areas studied were how to make reserve component forces easier to access and use, and how to train, equip, and manage the reserve component better to ensure its effective use.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy For a New Century* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, December 1999), 3.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>60</sup>William S. Cohen, *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1991), 4.

Key recommendations of this report were:

1. Increasing the reserve components role in small scale contingencies (SSC) in order to make more effective use of the range of skills in the reserve component, and to help manage operational tempo for the active component.
2. Alternating active and reserve component interpositional peacekeeping operations. The report states that by assuming the missions the ARC could increase reserve component participation in SSC while relieving some operational tempo of the active component. Assuming there are two such missions at a given time, by manning alternate rotations only eight percent of the total active light infantry battalions would be involved in supporting these missions versus seventeen percent.
3. ARC assuming a Bosnia-like peacekeeping operations. RCE-05 states that based on high financial costs (\$350 million above current costs) no further action should take place on this recommendation. However, in 2000, the Department of the Army announced the use of Army National Guard division headquarters in support of SFOR.
4. Expanding reserve component use in meeting high demand/low density requirements. RCE-05 recommended an increased use of Army National Guard Patriot batteries to relieve a portion of active component tempo.<sup>61</sup>

Although not authoritative, some of this document's recommendations were implemented by the U.S. Army. The *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005* suggested a level of integration beyond what most leaders believed possible, but as shown above, many of its recommendations are implemented and practiced each and every day.

President Clinton and General Shalikashvili's strategies completed the reversal of the Bush and Powell strategies of the early 1990's. Bush and Powell were intent on returning the reserve component to its strategic reserve role of the Cold War era. Clinton and Shalikashvili implemented a more historic role for the ARC. This role entailed ARC personnel and units supporting the smaller active army in all military operations to include those short of major theater war. This historic role hearkened back to the Mexican Boarder service of 1916 when 158,000 ARC soldiers mobilized and served, versus the Vietnam War experience when only 12,000 National Guard soldiers and 5800 Army Reserve soldiers were mobilized.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 9-11. This recommendation was achieved in January 2001 when an Alabama Army National Guard Patriot battery deployed to Saudi Arabia as part of Task Force 2-1 ADA battalion's Desert Spring deployment

<sup>62</sup>Robert S. Hunter, *2000 National Guard Almanac*, 203.

## **Participation of ARC Personnel and Units**

ARC personnel and units have participated in every major U.S. Army contingency operation since the end of ODS. Operation Uphold Democracy, Operation Provide Comfort, Operation Southern Watch, Operation Desert Spring, Operation Joint Forge, and Operation Restore Hope are just some of the operations that the ARC has participated in during the last decade. Table 1 shows the ARC contribution to U.S. Army operational deployments as a result of a Presidential Selective Reserve Call Up (PSRC) for the period 1995 to 2001.

Although the total number of direct support mandays provided by the reserve components to the Department of Defense is relatively large, the actual number of PSRC activated ARC personnel is very small. In Fiscal Year 1999 the reserve components provided approximately 12.5 million mandays to the Department of Defense, but only 1.1 million of these mandays were as a result of mobilizations. In any given year, the maximum percent of ARC soldiers activated is less than two percent per year of total personnel strength. For each component, their maximum participation is only 1.3% of total personnel strength for the Army Guard and 3.5% of total personnel strength for the Army Reserve. Even today, with the high number of ARC soldiers mobilized and on federal duty, only five percent of the total ARC force is mobilized. With such a small percent of the force mobilized each year, it is difficult for the small number of soldiers to have a significant impact on the ARC's attrition rate, as we will see in the next chapter.

**Table 1 ARC Contribution as a Result of PSRC (1995 to 2001)**

Year	ARNG Personnel <sup>63</sup>	USAR Personnel <sup>64</sup>	Total Participation
1995	773	41	814
1996	1995	1377	3372
1997	2312	350	2662
1998	2227	7200	9427
1999	1468	985	2453
2000	2864	4848	7712
2001	4566	3300	7866

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<sup>63</sup>National Guard Bureau, Army Deployment Action Officer. Provided to the author via email on 15 February 2001.

<sup>64</sup>The source for this data is the Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Years 1995 to 2001. Published by the U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### ATTRITION RATE STUDIES AND ARC ATTRITION RATES

*The Army's reliance on the Army Reserve's capabilities, especially in such areas as civil affairs, medical, engineering, logistics, transportation, military police, postal, public affairs and psychological operations, will ensure the Army Reserve will be in the Balkans as long as the Army remains there.*

--Major General Thomas J. Plewes, Chief Army Reserve<sup>65</sup>

#### Studies and Assessments

The true affects of operational deployments on ARC attrition remains unclear. The analysis of deployments, OPTEMPO, and attrition rate data has lead to differing opinions of the correlation between deployments and attrition. Those who support the current use of reserve forces in peacetime operational deployments include the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Charles Cragin. Assistant Secretary Cragin has stated that reserve component retention was a more serious issue a few years ago when the ARC was less often used. His current feeling is the more the ARC is used, the greater the recruiting and retention incentive for soldiers.<sup>66</sup>

Those opposed to the use of reserve component forces in peacetime operational deployments cite the negative impact these deployments have on reserve soldiers as a reason for the discontinuation of the use of reserve component soldiers in peacetime operational deployments. In an editorial, *National Review's* national political reporter, John Miller, argued that the current policy of utilizing ARC personnel in support of peacetime operational missions will result in "depleting the reserves" and "bleeding them dry over time."<sup>67</sup> He believes that the failure of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, and Air Force Reserve to meet their recruiting goals during the

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<sup>65</sup>Major General Thomas J. Plewes, Statement before the Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate First Session, 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, 9 May 2001.

<sup>66</sup>Chris Maddaloni, "A Bigger Piece of Peacekeeping," *National Guard*, (January 2000): 20.

<sup>67</sup>John J. Miller, "Unreserved: The Misuse of America's Reserve Forces," *National Review*, (23 July 2001): 26.

period 1998 to 2000 is evidence the depletion and bleeding of the reserve component is a real threat.

Also opposed to the use of reserve component forces in peacetime operational deployments is retired Army Reserve Colonel, author, and current faculty member of National Defense University James T. Currie. He described the following as his vision of the future reserve component if the current ARC deployment practice continues:

If the present deployment strategy continues, the best people, the ones with responsible civilian careers, will no longer be able to serve as reservists. Those who remain, with the exception of a few super-patriots willing to sacrifice everything for the sake of wearing the uniform on a sometime basis, are likely to be chiefly marginal individuals for whom reserve deployments will mean an increase in pay, and whose civilian careers will be so inconsequential as to be irrelevant. If this occurs, the reserves will have lost the very excellence that makes them valuable when they are truly needed. They will then be nothing more than a sacrificial monument to misguided policies conjured up by senior officers who have lost touch with what it means to be a young man or woman striving to build a civilian career while also trying to serve one's country.<sup>68</sup>

Finally, the Armed Forces Reserve Policy Board Review of Fiscal Year 1999 stated "the increased use of the reserve component is beginning to take a toll on the force. The added strains on individual members and their families are now being reflected in recruiting and retention figures for the reserve components, much as they have been for some time in the active force. The reserve components may be nearing the threshold at which many of its members decide the time and effort required to participate is too high for the level of compensation received, and they opt to leave."<sup>69</sup>

Those describing the depletion or demise of the reserve component are in contradiction to at least four studies on the affects of deployments and high OPTEMPO. These four studies reveal the conflicting evidence in attempting to indicate a correlation between high PERSTEMPO and

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<sup>68</sup>James T. Currie, "Remember, They're Not Replacements," *Washington Post*, 25 March 2001, sec. B, 3.

<sup>69</sup>Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board Fiscal Year 1999*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2000), 13

OPTEMPO caused by operational deployments and high personnel attrition. The following is a short description of these four studies and their conclusions.

### **Castro and Adler**

Carl Castro and Amy Adler conducted a study of the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) in order to explore the relationship between operations tempo and soldier and unit readiness. Although this study focused on active duty personnel in Europe, its conclusions are pertinent to the issues faced by mobilized reservists. In their article, entitled “OPTEMPO: Effects on Soldier and Unit Readiness”, Castro and Adler argue that a certain amount of deployment is good for the readiness of a unit. They hypothesize that a soldier’s “deployment tempo” is a more important factor when determining the effects of deployments on soldiers rather than just the total number of deployments a soldier participates in. Castro and Adler’s determined deployment tempo by dividing the total number of deployments served by a soldier by the total number of years the soldier has served.<sup>70</sup>

To illustrate “deployment tempo” consider the following scenario: Soldier A is a soldier with two years of service and serves on two deployments. His deployment tempo is 1.0. Soldier B is a soldier with ten years service and serves on two deployments. He will have a deployment tempo of 0.20. Soldier A has a deployment tempo five times greater than Soldier B despite having the same number of deployments. Using this technique in a survey of over 2,250 soldiers assigned to USAREUR, they were able to determine that soldiers entering service today can expect to deploy every eighteen months versus soldiers with more than ten years of service. The soldier with over ten years of service has deployed on an average of once every six years.<sup>71</sup> Their position is that Soldier A is at a greater risk to leave the military because of their much higher deployment tempo.

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<sup>70</sup>Carl A. Castro and Amy Adler, 87.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid. 88.

Other factors relating to deployment tempo is the length of deployment, the geographical location of the deployment, nature of military operation, and the public support of the operation. An example of these factors is displayed in the deployment practices of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. In operational deployments, these two components differ in their deployment duration. The Air National Guard will deploy their personnel and units for as little as thirty days at a time. The Army National Guard's deployment time line is typically not less than 120 days. Therefore, one Army National Guard deployment is worth four Air National Guard deployments.

Castro and Adler concluded that deployments are not in themselves negative in nature. Over half of the USAREUR soldiers surveyed indicated that their deployments made their work more interesting, and almost half indicated that deployments related to them the importance of their work. For these soldiers, deployments worked as a motivating factor. One criticism of this study is the selection of the two groups they used for comparison. Younger soldiers, despite their deployment rates are normally at a higher risk to leave military service than older soldiers. Soldiers with over ten years of military service have already committed to a military career and therefore have a lower attrition rate. This is shown by the traditionally much higher attrition rate for first term soldiers versus career soldier attrition rate.

### **Kirby and Naftel**

Sheila Nataraj Kirby and Scott Naftel conducted a survey of strictly reserve personnel in an attempt to determine the impact of deployments on the retention of military reservists both mobilized and not mobilized for the Gulf War. In this study, they concluded that mobilization for ODS did not appear to have an adverse affect on military reservist retention. In addition, the possibility for future activations had a positive, albeit small effect on retention. This data

suggested that reserve soldiers welcomed the opportunity to put their military training to use in an operational environment.<sup>72</sup>

Because reserve component service is not the primary source of income for most ARC soldiers, many competing factors affect their participation. Traditionally, the primary factors competing for potential and continued ARC service are family attitudes and support, employer attitude and support, and individual service satisfaction. In describing how these factors interact with the decision to serve in reserve component units Kirby and Naftel used the Moonlight Labor Market Theory (MLMT) designed by Robert Shishko and Bernard Rostker.

Shishko and Rostker's MLMT theory states that individuals will make time allocations among primary jobs, moonlighting (or secondary) jobs, family, leisure, and schooling. An individual will make time allocation decisions based on the likely net monetary and nonmonetary benefits from moonlighting when considering secondary employment. They will continue to make these time allocation decisions throughout their careers when deciding to enter, remain, or leave a moonlighting occupation.<sup>73</sup> The value each individual places on the monetary and nonmonetary benefits depends on three primary factors: the characteristics of the individual, the characteristics of the position or job, and the characteristics of the primary employer.

When applied to ARC service the first factor, the characteristic of the individual, includes elements such as age, gender, education level, marital status, number of children, and level of family support. The second factor, characteristics of the reserve position, includes elements such as pay, years of military service, military component, type of unit, possibility of mobilization, mobilization experience, patriotism, and overall satisfaction with their reserve participation. The final factor, characteristics of the reservist's primary civilian employment, includes elements such

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<sup>72</sup>Sheila Nataraj Kirby and Scott Naftel, "The Impact of Deployment on the Retention of Military Reservists," *Armed Forces and Society* 26, no 2 (Winter 2000):267.

<sup>73</sup>Robert Shihko and Bernard Rostker, "The Economics of Multiple Job Holding," *The American Economic Review* 66, no 3 (June 1976): 299.

as employment status, type of employer, pay, availability of overtime, and employer support of reserve service.<sup>74</sup>

Therefore, an individual's decision to accept service in the reserve component is conditional upon the assigned value of the three factors and the perceived benefit to or cost to these factors . As the decision-making environment changes (an element of one of the three primary factors), an individual may reverse their decision to participate in reserve component service. In the case of increased mobilization risk or in the event of an actual mobilization, an individual with low commitment to military service, those facing income loss when mobilized, those with a spouse or children, or those with jobs that could be hurt by mobilization may reconsider their decision to remain in the reserve force.<sup>75</sup> Of course, mobilization can be positive also. A reserve component soldier may look forward to mobilization or seek out opportunities to mobilize in anticipation of the potential or perceived benefits. Therefore, it is impossible to say that mobilizations have a positive or negative effect when looking at individual soldiers because every individual is different.

Kirby and Naftel used the MLMT in conducting their study on deployment effects. In their study, they studied the effects of changing only one variable to the two different soldier models. The soldier models had the following characteristics:

Model	Age	Race	Sex	Component	Pay Grade	MOS	YOS
A	27	White	M	USAR	E5	Technical	4-6
B	33	White	M	USAR	E5	Technical	7-12

Changing the characteristics of the job (unit was mobilized during ODS) they found that Model A personnel were sixteen percent more likely to remain in service than those who did not mobilize. Model B personnel were twenty-one percent less likely to continue service than those who did not deploy. Changing the characteristics of the job in a different manner, (the possibility

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<sup>74</sup>Sheila Nataraj Kirby and Scott Naftel, 260.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

of mobilization increased), Model A personnel saw little change in the probability of continuing service while Model B personnel were significantly more likely to remain in service.<sup>76</sup> Thus, no pattern of deployment to retention affect is drawn from the change of this variable. Other patterns were identified during the study.

Changing the characteristics of the individual resulted the following findings: women were less than half as likely to remain in service for both models, minorities were more likely to remain in service, age had little effect on retention, as did education level, marital status, and number of dependents. An individual characteristic that played a large factor was spousal attitude. In both Model A and Model B personnel, spouses of those who had mobilized during ODS were significantly less likely to support continued reserve component service. Those soldiers with spouses with unsupportive attitudes were eighty percent less likely to remain in service. Conversely, highly supportive spouses did not necessarily mean higher retention rates.<sup>77</sup>

Characteristics of the civilian job again reflect conflicting data. For Model A personnel and Model B personnel their employer's attitude towards service had little to do with service. Employers with both perceived favorable and unfavorable attitudes toward reserve component service had positive effects on the decision to remain in service.<sup>78</sup> The lack of impact by employer support may be due to the federal laws that protect the employment rights of reserve component soldiers, the participation of the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) organization in mitigating soldier/employer conflict, and the ability of reserve component soldiers to switch jobs if their employment conflict becomes unacceptable.

Kirby and Naftel's study failed to identify a pattern of negative affects on attrition by participating in operational deployments. In one group the activation and deployment in support of ODS resulted in an increased desire to leave reserve component service, while in another group

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<sup>76</sup>Ibid., 263-265.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., 265.

the opposite affect took place. An increased risk of mobilization also failed to show a universal affect of operational deployments on service continuation decisions. The one mobilization consistency that Kirby and Naftel did reveal was its consistently negative affect on spousal support of reserve service, and its corresponding negative affect on the retention of mobilized soldiers.

## **Reed and Segal**

In another study, Brian Reed and David Segal investigated the impact of multiple, nontraditional or constabulary deployments on attitudes, morale, and retention on active component soldiers. Their purpose was to “provide an analysis of the effects of increased deployments on soldier morale and reenlistment intentions, because high morale and retention are critical to maintaining an effective fighting force.”<sup>79</sup> Although this study focuses on soldiers of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light), the conclusions made by Reed and Segal may provide insight into potential ARC deployment related attrition problems.

In their study Reed and Segal found that overall, the majority of 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division soldiers did view peacekeeping operations as an appropriate military mission. Soldiers with multiple deployments were much less inclined to view these missions as appropriate missions for infantry units and believed them more appropriate for military police or reserve component units. All surveyed soldiers believed that peacekeeping deployments were harder on soldiers with families than on soldiers with no families.<sup>80</sup> Thus, Reed and Segal concluded that multiple deployments did not have a significantly negative affect on soldiers deployed multiple times.

In terms of morale Reed and Segal found that soldiers reporting high or very high morale were greatly affected by multiple deployments. Twenty-six percent of soldiers with one deployment reported high or very high morale while only sixteen percent of soldiers with three or

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<sup>79</sup>Brian J. Reed and David R. Segal, “The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldier’s Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale, and Retention,” *Armed Forces and Society* 27, no 1 (Fall 2000): 57-58.

<sup>80</sup>*Ibid.*, 75-76.

more deployments reported high or very high morale.<sup>81</sup> This lower morale was attributed to boredom, the stress placed on their family during extended separations, and the belief that these deployments were not beneficial to their careers or their units.

Despite the negative attitudes toward the appropriateness of their involvement in peacekeeping missions and the lower morale associated with multiple deployments, Reed and Segal found no statistical data indicating a relationship between the number of deployments and reenlistment desires. They stated that they found this lack of relationship interesting for two reasons. First, earlier studies had indicated that previously deployed soldiers were more inclined to leave the army over nondeployed soldiers.<sup>82</sup> Secondly, the recent concerns from military leaders and congressional leaders that increased OPTEMPO was having a negative impact on military retention.<sup>83</sup>

### **Hosek and Totten**

James Hosek and Mark Totten studied the effect of long or hostile deployments on reenlistment. Their model focused on the relationship between deployments, promotions, and retention. A key assumption made by Hosek and Totten was “that a service member’s satisfaction derived from military service is a function of expected and actual deployment, and therefore deployment affects the reenlistment decision.” They believe that a soldier will form an expectation about the frequency, duration, and risks of deployments and the level of satisfaction a deployment may bring at the outset of service. The actual level of deployment may not meet the expected level, may meet the expected level, or may exceed the expected level. When a soldier nears his ETS, his decision to extend is determined by the relationship between expected deployments and actual deployments.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., 60.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., 76.

<sup>84</sup>James Hosek and Mark Totten, 33-34.

In their study, Hosek and Totten, concluded that soldiers involved in one or more nonhostile deployments had a higher probability of reenlistment than soldiers who did not experience a nonhostile deployment. This conclusion was based on the following information for first term soldiers: Over ninety percent of these personnel felt they were positively affected by long or hostile duty. This duty resulted in the probability of reenlistment increasing by twenty-one percent on the average. Of the ten percent who did not experience a positive effect, their expected reenlistment declined by thirteen percent. The net affect on the probability of reenlistment was thus  $(.90 \times 21\%) + (.10 \times -13\%) = 17.6\%$ . For early career soldiers, those with less than twelve years of service, the result is a six percent increase in the probability of reenlisting  $(.92 \times 7\%) + (.08 \times -4\%) = 6.1\%$ .<sup>85</sup>

Hosek and Trotten's belief was that deployments generally followed this pattern unless additional long duty or hostile duty fell inside a twenty-four month period following deployment. If this duty took place within twenty-four months of deployment then reenlistment rates decreased by an average of five percent in the Army. This minor decrease, Hosek and Trotten felt, could be overcome by other incentives such as a relative increase in pay.<sup>86</sup>

### **What Are the Numbers**

The attrition rate numbers in Table 2 indicate that operational deployments do not have a negative affect on the ARC's attrition. Supporting this conclusion is the consistent decrease in the Army National Guard's overall attrition rate during the period 1993-2000 (a decrease of almost six percent). This decrease of overall attrition comes during a period of increased utilization and deployment of Army Guard forces in support of peacetime operational deployments. Although the Army Reserve's attrition rate has not decreased at the same pace of the Army Guard's, their fairly steady attrition rate indicates the lack of a negative impact on their attrition. Because such a

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<sup>85</sup>Ibid., 48.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., 56.

small percentage of ARC personnel are federalized during the course of a year, it is difficult for even the mass exodus of deployed to have a quick effect on overall component attrition rate. For example, if every soldier deployed in Fiscal Year 1999 left the service this would increase the Army Guard's 1999 attrition rate by only .4%.

Even the attrition rate of high demand units indicates a small, if any, deployment impact on attrition. High demand units in the Army Guard from 1997-1999 averaged an attrition rate only 1.2% greater than the Army Guard's overall attrition rate (see Table 2 and 3). The Army Reserve's high demand units averaged an attrition rate of 1.4% below the Army Reserve's overall attrition rate (see Table 2 and 4).

If the use of ARC personnel in peacetime operational deployments seems to have little affect on the overall satisfaction of the current members (measured by attrition rate), what is the impact on potential members? In terms of new enlistment accessions, the reserve component achieved its best recruiting years of the 1990s during the last three years of the decade.<sup>87</sup> In addition, the ARC was at a higher percentage of end strength at the end of the decade than at any other time of the decade.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup>The source for this data is the Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Years 1992 to 2001. Published by the U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. This is based on percentage of accession mission achieved and not by total accessions for the fiscal year.

<sup>88</sup>The source for this data is the Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Years 1992 to 2001. Published by the U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

**Table 2 Annual Total Attrition for ARC (FY-93 to FY-00)<sup>89</sup>**

Fiscal Year	ARNG Attrition Rate	USAR Attrition Rate
FY-93	22.0%	28.9%
FY-94	19.0%	26.8%
FY-95	20.9%	28.9%
FY-96	18.4%	30.4%
FY-97	17.7%	32.0%
FY-98	17.4%	29.5%
FY-99	17.7%	25.0%
FY-00	16.4%	27.8%

**Table 3 Annual Total Attrition for ARNG High Demand Units (FY-97 to FY-99)<sup>90</sup>**

Fiscal Year	ARNG Attrition Rate	Type of Unit	Attrition Rate
FY-97	17.7%	Aviation	16.3%
		Transportation	17.8%
		Military Police	21.5%
FY-98	17.4%	Engineer	19.5%
		Special Forces	18.5%
		Aviation	20.3%
FY-99	17.7%	Public Affairs	22.0%
		Engineer	17.9%
		Special Forces	17.5%

<sup>89</sup>The source for this data is the Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Years 1993 to 2001. Published by the U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

<sup>90</sup>United States Department of Defense, *Profile of the Reserve Component*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, Power Point Presentation, 2000.

**Table 4 Annual Total Attrition Rate for USAR High Demand Units (FY-97 to FY-99)<sup>91</sup>**

Fiscal Year	USAR Attrition Rate	Type of Unit	Attrition Rate
1997	32.0%	Civil Affairs	24.0%
		PSYOP	26.0%
		Engineer Firefighting	32.0%
1998	29.5%	Civil Affairs	29.4%
		PSYOP	29.4%
		Engineer Firefighting	24.1%
1999	25.0%	CA/PSYOP	24.0%
		Engineer Firefighting	26.0%
		Chemical	31.0%

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<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

## IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

*Finally, our increased dependence on the Reserve Component will require us to address the concerns of our reserve members and their employers regarding the impact on civilian careers. The Department of Defense and Services must meet these challenges head-on.*

-- General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>92</sup>

### Strategic Implications

According to data available, the use of the ARC in peacetime operational deployments is not having a negative impact on the ARC's attrition rate. The implication of this conclusion is that it calls for the even greater use of the ARC in support of the active component. Associated with the greater utilization of the ARC is the corresponding risk of over extending the ARC's capability to provide a large number of soldiers to the U.S. Army without suffering negative complications. This risk involves the potential of a higher attrition rate becoming a reality as more ARC soldiers experience tension between their reserve component service and family support along with friction between their reserve component service and employer support. As the ARC monitors peacetime operational deployments and the implications of these deployments on their personnel the following indicators, in addition to the ARC's attrition rate, may provide warning signs of potential problems.

1. Enlistment rates decreasing. During the period 1997-2000 the Army National Guard achieved an average of 106% of their assigned accession mission. The Army Reserve achieved an average of ninety-seven percent of their assigned accession mission. These results rank the ARC services as first and fourth among the seven reserve component services. Another enlistment factor to consider is the participation of prior service in reserve component service. If the ARC is

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<sup>92</sup>Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2000), 20.

called up to participate more actively in peacetime operational deployments prior service members may elect to avoid reserve component service in order to avoid possible mobilizations. This affect would have a devastating impact on the accession missions of the ARC. During the period 1997-2000 the Army National Guard annually received fifty-five percent of its accessions from prior service members. The Army Reserve annually enlisted seventy percent of its total accessions from prior service members.<sup>93</sup> A significant refusal of prior service members to serve in the ARC would impact the ARC from manning its units.

2. Reenlistment rates among career soldiers. This rate will provide insight into sudden perceptual attitude changes of the career soldier towards their membership and service. If the reenlistment rate of this group suddenly decreases the conclusion can be drawn that a significant variable has changed the level of membership satisfaction.

3. The development of a constabulary mentality in the ARC in either its members or senior leadership. The ARC must not loose focus of its historical and constitutional mission of providing combat capable units to the nation during a national crisis. In written testimony to the Armed Services Committee, the Associate Director National Security Preparedness Issues wrote that the active army division readiness of divisions participating in contingency operations was adversely affected by their service. His conclusion was based on studying the reported readiness levels of all active divisions during the years 1995-1999.<sup>94</sup> To ensure the ARC does not develop a constabulary mentality all units of the ARC must be assigned warfighting missions and be assigned to a combatant commander as stated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

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<sup>93</sup>All data was gained from the Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Years 1997-2000. Published by the U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

<sup>94</sup>Carol R. Schuster, "Contingency Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses Challenges," Written testimony to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, (Washington, D.C.: eMedia Mill Works, Inc, 6 July 2000).

## **Recommendations**

The decision to join a reserve component service and the decision to leave a reserve component service are complicated decisions based on several variables. These decision influencing variables include service related satisfaction, family support of service, and employer support of service. As the war on terrorism continues, the ARC will remain an active participant in military operations in direct support of the war and in contingency operations that allow the availability of U.S. Army forces for other war related missions. At this time, there is no indication of a policy shift that would decrease the reliance on ARC personnel and units by the U.S. Army. The following are recommendations to the senior leadership of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to ensure the continued successful use of ARC personnel and units in fulfilling their role in support of the National Military Strategy.

Recommendation: National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Army Reserve should begin to track deployed soldiers and their service status following the completion of their mobilization. The ARC should recognize that deployments and their implications do not end with the return of the soldiers. The impacts of the deployment are felt for years following the soldiers return. The goal of this recommendation is to identify soldiers leaving the service within a three year window following the completion of a peacetime operational deployment and their reasons for departure. Three years is selected for this tracking because it provides timeliness between the end of a deployment and departure of the soldier, but does not extend the window beyond the “cause and effect” window. Key to this is ensuring an exit interview is conducted with each departing soldier to ensure a cause and effect can be established. By doing so, a better understanding of the affects of peacetime operational deployments on soldier attrition and other factors such as civilian employment conflict and family attitudes toward reserve component service is established. Currently, most of the data available for research is based on ODS data. This mobilization differs from the peacetime operational deployments conducted during the later part of the 1990s in size

of mobilization, the implications of military action directed towards a hostile nation, and the belief that ODS mobilization was a one-time, short-term mobilization that would not take place again in the near future. State Area Commands (STARCs) of the Army National Guard and Regional Support Commands (RSC) of the Army Reserve could track this information and provide annual reports to NGB and USAR.

Recommendation: Continue to rely on volunteer participation in peacetime operational deployments as much as possible. The purpose of this recommendation is to allow those who want to deploy the maximum opportunity to participate in operational deployments and protect those with limited desire to participate in operational deployments from deploying. There are certainly times when personnel would be involuntarily federalized, but this should be done as a last result. Personnel at highest risk to be involuntarily mobilized are those with special technical or professional skills. Involuntary mobilizations would normally take place only during a time of national crisis when large numbers of reservists are required.

Recommendation: Allow deployed units to rotate personnel through the unit during its deployment. The goal of this recommendation is to shorten the length of deployment for each soldier. For example, an infantry brigade may be tasked with providing two rifle companies for security force operations in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The stated deployment is for 120 days of service. The brigade commander would have the option of providing two companies worth of soldiers for 120 days each or four companies worth of soldiers for sixty days of service each. The benefit to the individual soldier is a shorter deployment tour by fifty percent. The cost to such a recommendation is an increase in deployment costs per unit. Added costs to this recommendation are each affected deployment would cost approximately double of the former cost in terms of transportation and Power Project Platform (PPP) costs. Personnel and equipment costs would remain the same. Leadership issues can be addressed by deploying a “cadre” of leadership who would remain with the unit during the entire deployment. This cadre would provide the continuity between the two short deployments.

Recommendation: Continue to utilize multi-component units during operational deployments. The purpose of this policy is to maximize the integration of the active and reserve forces and reduce the overtaxing of either component. An example of this type of integrated unit during an operational deployment was the deployment of 2-1 Air Defense Battalion to Southwest Asia in support of Desert Spring in January 2001. This active duty battalion deployed with one Patriot battery of the Alabama Army National Guard while leaving one Patriot battery in Fort Bliss, Texas. This multi-component unit deployment provided OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO relief to part of 2-1 ADA Battalion by replacing one of its batteries, and provided the opportunity for the unit to learn about integrating a reserve component unit into its organization. In addition, this deployment provided the Army Guard Patriot battery the opportunity to increase its tactical and technical proficiency by deploying, serving, and training with its active component counterpart.

Recommendation: Lessen the mobilization time spent by ARC personnel and units prior to actual deployment. The goal of this policy is to limit the time spent by ARC personnel at their home station and the PPP preparing for mobilization. By reducing the time spent at the PPP the unit is able to reduce their overall deployment time while providing the same number of days in theater providing support to the operational mission.<sup>95</sup> Ways to accomplish this are:

a. Implement a joint pay system. The goal of this recommendation is to ease the transition of reserve component personnel into the military pay system. Currently the Army National Guard's pay system is different from the U.S. Army's pay system. Each deploying soldier must be entered into the new pay system during their mobilization activities at the PPP. This process typically is not done without errors and is time consuming. If the Army Guard converted to the same pay system used by the U.S. Army, there would be no need for reentering soldiers upon mobilization, speed deployment, and further integrate the components of the U.S. Army. The Defense

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<sup>95</sup>During the deployment of Company C 1-168<sup>th</sup> Infantry to Kuwait in January 2001, up to half of the unit spent one month at the Power Projection Platform prior to deployment and up to two weeks after their return from Kuwait conducting routine administrative duties. The feeling from the soldiers was that this was wasted time and should not be part of their commitment to the operation.

Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) is scheduled to become the system that achieves a joint pay system. This system's goal is to establish one personnel and pay system for use by all services. The full fielding of DIMHRS is currently over five years away. Until this system is implemented the Department of the Army should find a work-around to provide this capability.<sup>96</sup>

b. Conduct deployment from home station. The goal with this recommendation is not to replace the PPP, but to lessen the time spent away from home station by deploying soldiers. Units would be provided with the opportunity to conduct individual and unit mobilization tasks at home station when appropriate. If the scope of the mobilization exceeds the capabilities of the unit's higher headquarters then the PPP remains an option. Obviously, when large unit mobilizations or multiple unit mobilizations take place this may not be an option.

c. Utilize integrated data systems within the ARC and active component. The goal of this recommendation is to further integrate the components of the U.S. Army and decrease the pre-deployment time for units. Personnel and property data bases are not currently uniform between the Army Guard and the U.S. Army.

d. Provide more full-time support staff (FTSS) for the ARC to accomplish planning, preparation, and administrative tasks. The goal of this recommendation is to reduce the amount of time a soldier spends during mobilization being administratively assessed into the active military system. As a result of Congress' decision to fund only a portion of FTSS requirements, the ARC is staffed with only fifty-seven percent of their required full-time support staff.<sup>97</sup> All other reserve components are staffed at seventy-six percent or higher. Benefits of more full time support is the decreased time each unit must spend during unit training assemblies to conduct administrative duties, increased ability to conduct complex and detailed planning, and an increased ability to

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<sup>96</sup>Rudi Williams, "DOD Creating New All Service Personnel, Pay System," Web site accessed 14 March 2001. Available at <http://www.army.mil/usar/>.

<sup>97</sup>Fiscal Year 2000 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, 37.

prepare the unit for potential mobilization. Units would be able to focus on training activities and not conducting administrative tasks.<sup>98</sup>

Recommendation: Limit the number of deployments per soldier. The goal of this policy is to ensure that there is an equal distribution of deployments between units and personnel. Some missions do not call for a particular unit capability, but a more general or common skill capability. This is not a call for infantry units to conduct the mission of a Target Acquisition Battery, but instead calls for the use of the entire force in common skill missions. For example, the units conducting security for Patriot missile sites in Southwest Asia do not have to be infantry units as they have traditionally been. A mission essential task for all U.S. Army units is unit security. Therefore, any unit from the armor, transportation, or artillery community is theoretically able to conduct this mission. More troubling is the question of how frequent can deployments take place without putting undo stress on the unit, soldier, their families, and their employers. Hosek and Totten's study indicated that any deployment coming within twenty-four months of completing a deployment for active component soldiers causes a decrease in the reenlistment desires of soldiers. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Deborah Lee stated that members of the reserve component should expect to be involuntarily mobilized once every five years.<sup>99</sup> Lieutenant General Plewes, Chief of the Army Reserve, stated that the deployment cycle may be once every four or five years.<sup>100</sup> Lieutenant General Roger Schultz, Director of the Army National Guard, stated that the correct frequency may be no more than once every five or six years.<sup>101</sup> Although this does not constitute an official policy, these statements indicate a goal of

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<sup>98</sup>An example of the low-level FTSS is the 34<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. The division headquarters is only manned to a 40% level of requirements. Currently the division is planning to conduct SFOR 14 and with the potential of three other battalion level contingency operations.

<sup>99</sup>Reid K. Beveridge, "Guard, Reserve Reemployment Could Be Assured by Tricare," *Army Times*, (22 May 2000), 62.

<sup>100</sup>Currie, "Remember, They're Not Replacements."

<sup>101</sup>Remarks made by LTG Roger Schultz to the author on 15 November 2001.

the senior leadership to minimize the number of involuntary deployments a soldier is forced to participate in. This goal ensures that only career soldiers would face multiple deployments.

Recommendation: Provide tax or other incentives to employers who have employees activated for state or federal service. The goal of this recommendation is to provide financial incentives to businesses that actively support reserve component soldiers during their deployments. Longer tours and more frequent deployments of reserve component soldiers have begun to strain the relationship between employers and their reserve component employees. A possible way to alleviate this friction and to encourage hiring of reserve component soldiers is to provide employers tax or financial incentives when their employees are activated for federal or even state military duty. Examples of this type of incentives include allowing business to receive a tax credit when hiring replacement employees for deployed employees or possibly receiving a credit for income or other benefits provided to deployed soldiers while deployed. The Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program provides loan funds to eligible small businesses to cover expenses associated with the activation of reserve component employees. Small businesses may apply for loans up to \$1.5 million for severe financial impact brought on by the loss of a key employee.<sup>102</sup> Another example of employer incentives is covering all reserve component personnel and their families with Tricare. These not only provide incentives to enlist into the reserve component, but provide a financial incentive to employers as well. Employers would no longer be required to provide health insurance to employees who belong to the reserve component and as a result decreases employee related expenses. This recommendation is aimed at recognizing the important role that civilian employers play in supporting the National Military Strategy of the United States.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>102</sup>“Guard Employees May Apply for Assistance”, *National Guard* 56, no 2 (February 2002):13.

<sup>103</sup>For more insight into the relationship between reserve component personnel and their employers see Clarence Hilton, “The Impact of Deployments of the Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve on Employer Relations,” Strategic Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001).

## Operation Nobel Eagle/Enduring Freedom

Within minutes of the terrorist attacks in New York, the Pentagon, and western Pennsylvania, ARC soldiers and units were responding to the scenes and providing support. Within twenty-four hours of the attacks over 6000 Guard and Reserve personnel were providing assistance to the state and federal authorities. Two days following the attacks President Bush authorized the partial mobilization of up to 50,000 reserve members.<sup>104</sup>

The reserve component's continued participation in this operation has grown considerably since the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. Currently there are almost 81,000 reservists serving on active duty in support of the partial mobilization, of which almost 28,000 are ARC soldiers.<sup>105</sup> These personnel are supporting scheduled deployments in support of contingency operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia as well as new missions in the Sinai Desert, Europe, and areas in and around Afghanistan.

An additional 7,200 National Guard personnel continue to provide security at over 430 airports in the U.S. while another 824 Guard personnel provide support to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at their U.S. land Ports-of-Entry.<sup>106</sup> The service with the INS expected to end within six months, or when sufficient additional INS agents are hired. The National Guard service at the nation's airports should continue until the end of May when the Transportation Security Administration believes that replacement security personnel will be hired.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup>Craig W. Duehring, Statement Before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services in Connection with Reserve Component Issues, 13 February 2002. Web site available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/testimonies/duehring1.htm>. U.S. Code Title 10, Section 12302, provides for up to one million personnel to be mobilized for up to two years.

<sup>105</sup>United States Department of Defense, "National Guard and Reserve Mobilized as of March 13," Defenselink. Web site accessed 14 March 2001. Web site available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/b033132002\\_bt121-02.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/b033132002_bt121-02.html).

<sup>106</sup>Duehring.

<sup>107</sup>Jonathan D. Salant, "Troops to Leave U.S. Airports," *Washington Post*, 2 April 2002, sec. E, p. E3.

Mr. Craig Duehring, the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, remarked to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services that he believed it was too early to determine the long-term impacts on the National Guard and Reserve from its increased operational deployments in support of homeland security while continuing to support existing commitments in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia. He went on to say:

One immediate factor will be how well the mobilization and demobilization is managed. Predictability is important, which means ensuring Reservists receive advance notification of mobilizations so they can notify their employers well in advance. Also, communication with families and employers is key to ensuring their cooperation and support in making them feel like “part of the team.”...the National Guard and Reserve will continue to plan an expanded role in all facets of the Total Force. While we ask our people to do more, we must never lose sight of the need to balance their commitment to country with their commitment to family, and to their civilian employer.<sup>108</sup>

While no one now can accurately predict the levels of reserve component participation in the upcoming campaigns of Operation Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom, it is safe to say that their participation will remain high for the foreseeable future. It appears that the ARC’s support of operations in the Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia will represent the minimum participation level, while additional missions providing security of U.S. international borders, airports, key infrastructure, and an expanded role of its Civil Support Teams (CST) will continue for the foreseeable future. The key challenge for the senior leadership of the ARC is to ensure that these operations do not inflict long-term damage to the Army Reserve and Army National Guard in the form of high attrition rates. If the ARC is not able to avoid high attrition rates, then their participation as a full member of the U.S. Army’s team is threatened. Once this takes place the Total Force envisioned by General Abrams so long ago will certainly draw its last breath.

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<sup>108</sup>Duehring.

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